Impact of Cyber Threats to Nuclear Facility by Kayumbe, Erasto & Michael, Lucy
International Journal of Computer and Information Technology (ISSN: 2279 – 0764)  
Volume 9– Issue 6, November 2020 
 
www.ijc it .com     157 
 
Impact of Cyber Threats to Nuclear Facility 
 
Erasto Kayumbe 
ICT and Statistics Unit, Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission  
Arusha, Tanzania 
Email: kayumbe [AT] yahoo.co.uk 
 
Lucy Michael 
Institute of Social Work 
Dar es salaam, Tanzania 
Email: lucymikel3 [AT] gmail.com
 
Abstract— International community has been traditionally 
focusing on physical threats to facilities and pass by the 
threat of a cyber attack on a facility. All the same, due to the 
growing threat posed by cyber attacks; cyber security is 
becoming  indispensable component of nuclear facilities and 
it is setting up itself as a main concern for facility operators 
and national regulators. Consequently, ensuring the 
security of nuclear facilities is a considerable element, which 
gears at avoiding theft of nuclear materials and sabotage. 
For that reason, this paper was set to examine impact of 
cyber threats to nuclear facility. Specifically, the paper has 
examined cyber threats, cyber threats to nuclear facility, 
impact of cyber threats to nuclear facility. It is concluded  
that cyber threat to nuclear facility is growing despite 
numerous effort taken to offset the problem. Thus, there is 
a need either to design or improve available cyber threat 
mitigation procedure in order to tone down the problem. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cyber is a prefix that stand for computer and electromagnetic 
spectrum  related works. The cyber domain consist of the 
Internet of networked computers, cellular technologies, space-
based communications and fiber-optic cables (Nye and Joseph, 
2011). A cyber threat is an activity planned to cooperate the 
security of an information system by changing the availability, 
integrity, or secrecy of a system or the information it contains. 
Cyber threats are tremendously growing and are exploiting 
capabilities created by the modernization of the power systems 
(ENISA, 2013). The cyber threat comes  in various shapes, 
sizes, and forms. The term cyber security implies a wide range 
of issues and solutions connected to protecting residential 
subscribers, communications service providers (CSPs) and 
business customers from malicious harmful content and 
internet activity. Cyber threat actors are groups, states or 
individuals who, with malicious intent, aim to take benefit of 
vulnerabilities, low cyber security awareness and technological 
developments to gain unauthorized access to information 
systems. Enhanced threat scenario leads to the possibility of 
occurrences of cyber terrorism as a means of attacking state’s 
critical infrastructures (IAEA, NSS, 17). 
Malicious cyber activity is a security challenge facing many 
organizations across public and private sectors (Australia’s 
cyber security strategy, 2016). The possible methods of a cyber 
attack on a nuclear infrastructure may include methods like: 
Exploiting an insider (insider threat); Social engineering 
method; and Supply chain contamination method (Dilipraj, 
2019).  Hence, several key systems like monitoring and Process 
Control Systems (PCS), Control Systems (DCS), Supervisory 
Control, Distributed and Physical Protection Systems (PPS), 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) that function on cyber resources are 
vulnerable to cyber threats (Dilipraj, 2019). Following this, 
high technology cyber possessions are employed in the nuclear 
infrastructure such as nuclear power plants Cyber attacks on 
civilian nuclear facilities can be take a form of three broad 
categories: access control systems, those that target business 
networks, and industrial control systems (ICS) - including 
security and safety systems. In the growing threat scenario, the 
likely occurrences of cyber terrorism as a means of attacking a 
state’s vital infrastructure has encouraged a number of national 
authorities to plan defenses and issue new regulations. Such 
regulations establish computer security requirements which 
affect nuclear facilities at different levels and at different stages 
of operation (IAEA, NSS 17). 
 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Although the protection of important infrastructure is a pillar of 
the cyber security plan of any government, cyber threat to 
nuclear facility is tremendously growing. Cybercriminal, state-
sponsored hackers, and cyber terrorists is hitting anyone, any 
place an in anytime. The attached nuclear facilities across the 
world is causing serious damage to the entire population. Due 
to that time to time measuring the impact of  cyber threat to 
nuclear facility is necessary.  The motive for the focus on cyber 
threats is due to the fact that it is the most significant new key 
elements that have entered the nuclear security arena in the last 
decades. Additionally it is quickly gaining prominence and 
importance due to growing reliance on digital tools and to 
game-changing events. Following this after several years in 
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which cyber attack at nuclear facilities has grown up it is right 
time now to try to capture its impact (Dagoumas, 2019). 
 
III. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The primary aim of this paper was to provide guidance specific 
to nuclear facilities on implementing security programme. This 
paper provides advice on evaluating present programmes and 
procedures. Given limited time and resources available the 
sources of data has been desk study review and included; books, 
journals, papers, reports some cutting across the World and 
others focusing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and United Republic of Tanzania in particular Tanzania Atomic 
Energy Commission. Also, this paper is supported by personal 
observation and observation gathered from other people. 
 
IV. CYBER THREATS  
Computers and electronic controls play a part in all civil nuclear 
facilities in design, commissioning, and operation (Department 
for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2017).   Cyber 
threats come from either internal or external attack (Jaccard, et 
al., 2013).  While external attack come from cyber criminals, 
internal attack come from inside threats such as employees  
(Jaccard, et al., 2013). The main cyber threats are robots, which 
allow an unauthorized user to control the compromised 
computer for a variety of malicious purposes (DHS 2009). 
There are  
other ten common types of cyber threats named malware, 
phishing, spear phishing, man in the middle, trojans, 
ransomware, denial of Service attack or Distributed Denial of 
Service Attack (DDoS), attacks on IoT Devices, data Breaches 
and malware on Mobile Apps.  Cyber threats are likely to be 
harmful than physical threats (Ossip, 2017). Cyber threats 
seems to be equal to cybercrime. The term cyber threats 
describe violence, which include non-state actors, which can 
involve disruptions of critical infrastructures or politically 
disruptive acts (Ossip, 2017). Since internet users are not 
expected to discover safety risks and threats by themselves, it is 
advisable to increase personal awareness of the cyber threats 
(Ossip, 2017). 
 
V. CYBER THREATS TO NUCLEAR FACILITY 
There are two broad types of nuclear device that are gun-type 
and implosion-type. While gun-type can be made from enriched 
uranium, implosion-type are sophisticated devices made from 
HEU or separated plutonium (SP) (International Panel on 
Fissile Materials (2015). Horrible cyber capabilities cause 
serious security challenges, in particular to the nuclear domain 
(Boulanin and White,  2014). The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) has listed three risk associated with cyber 
attacks on civil nuclear facilities that are cyber attack that 
corrupts a civil nuclear facility’s command and control system; 
an act of cyber sabotage and an act of cyber espionage 
(Donovan 2015; Boulanin and White,  2014).  
 
Computers has raised a new threat that cyber-attacks can 
conduct to nuclear facility (Gartze and Lindsay, 2017). Under 
this scenario Donovan 2015) has called upon countries to see 
the importance of strengthening computer security at all levels 
that will guard against cyber threats, which affect nuclear 
security. Computer security is part of important aspect of 
nuclear security in the newly expanding application of digital 
systems (Boulanin and White, 2014). Yet there is 
misconception that cyber-attacks cannot take place if a 
computer is not connected to internet, intranet, WiFi or router  
(Zetter, 2014). This argument is false as cyber-attacks in some 
places have be carried out even without the internet (Zetter, 
2014). It should be noted that since there is an expand of nuclear 
weapons which are linked to computers there is also an increase 
of a cyber against them (Boulanin and White,  2014).  
 
Cyber attacks can retard nuclear facility operations as well as 
compromise critical components within the C&C structures. 
There are two main systems for security in any nuclear facility 
that are instrument and control security (ICS) and facility 
network security (FNS). Consequently, computer security is 
being recognized as a key component in nuclear security. Thus 
as technology move on, the use of computers and computing 
systems in all areas of plant operations is expected to increase 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2016). Therefore, 
computer systems used for physical protection, nuclear safety 
to mention few should be protected against cyber-attack, 
manipulation or falsification (International Atomic Energy 
Agency, 2016). 
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VI. IMPACT OF CYBER THREATS TO NUCLEAR 
FACILITY 
There are several factors that determine vulnerability of nuclear 
plant, which leads to facility attack. To start with the design of 
the plant will determine the extent to which a nuclear plant is 
vulnerable to attacks. Other factor are organizational history of 
the plant, the technical operation of the plant, types of 
computers used in the plant, interaction of networks allowed by 
computers to mention few. Most of these attacks disturb supply 
in the facility, damage facilities, cause: delay hazard, risk 
adverse and risk reduction. Protecting nuclear facilities from 
damaging cyber-attacks is made more difficult by their 
complexity. A facility may include more than a thousand digital 
apparatus, including legacy systems without built-in security 
(Rudner, 2013). Older facilities are changing to digital systems 
that while often bringing bigger trustworthiness and safety, also 
turn out to be more vulnerable to cyber-attacks (Rudner, 2013). 
As the results the threats causes impacts to workers, the public 
or the environment (Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy, 2017).   
 
A. Business Networks  
Attacking on business networks likely to cause theft of sensitive 
data that can be used to blackmail or financial gain. There are 
several cyber threats to business network. To mention few there 
are automated exploit of a known vulnerability whereby attacks 
try to exploit vulnerabilities in Windows and it occur when all 
necessary patches are not installed (ISO/IEC, 2011). Malicious 
HTML email attacks HTML email, which links to a malicious 
when the use click mistakenly the link on that malicious website 
(ISO/IEC, 2011). Reckless web surfing by employees likely to 
affect company network with bot clients (Ambroz, 2012). 
Employees surfing online using company computer can 
normally be put under malware attack (Yan et al., 2011). In web 
server compromise website cause vulnerability if its custom 
code is poor written leaving some security holes to be exploited 
by attackers. Regarding data lost on a portable device portable 
devices such as laptops always at a high risk of being stolen 
(Hoard, 2017). Concerning reckless use of wi-fi hotspots the 
attacker can monitor traffic of the victims and steal their 
valuable information (ISO/IEC, 2011). Attackers can also 
control business system and lay a groundwork for a next 
attack.  Again the attacker can maneuver nuclear reactor control 
systems (Samani,  and Mcfarland, 2015). Cyber attacker 
facilitate theft of nuclear materials, it they also act as sabotage 
resulting in radiological release (Rudner, 2013). 
 
B. Access control systems 
An attack on access control system can lead to the theft of 
nuclear material. An attacker can easily hack into a badge 
permission system with the intention of gaining access over 
restricted parts of a facility (nuclear material are kept) and 
negotiation materials accounting systems to hide the 
theft. Cyber attack can disable some of the physical protection 
measures like closed circuit television cameras (Quevenco, 
2015). 
 
C. Industrial control systems (ICS) 
In this category the attack threats digital systems, which control 
sensors, heaters and valves. Again the attack can disable 
cooling systems that can lead to the release of radioactive 
material. The threats also affect system operators and market 
participants (Dagoumas, 2019).  In industrial control systems 
reconnaissance attacks collect control system network 
information, plan the network architecture, and figure out the 
device distinctiveness that are model number, manufacturer, 
supported network protocols, system memory map and system 
address (Morris and Wei, 2013). There are many computer-
based things in control systems (Cárdenas et al., 2011). 
Targeted attacks are the biggest threat to control system. These 
attacks are those where the miscreants know that they are 
targeting control systems  tailor their attack strategy with the 
aim of injuring the physical system under control. Targeted 
attacks not in favor of control systems are not new. Cyber-
attacks on industrial control system are cheaper,  not 
constrained by distance, less risky for the attacker and are easier 
to replicate and coordinate (Cárdenas et al., 2011). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Cyber threat to nuclear facility is gradually growing despite 
efforts taken to mitigate the problem. Lack of cyber security 
policies, procedures and training makes the situation 
worse. Yet, operators of nuclear facilities are not equipped to 
become aware of and act in response to cyber-attacks. 
Therefore, there is a need to develop or improve guidelines that 
will permit the measurement of cyber security risks in the 
nuclear industry, rising the awareness of the cyber threats 
among the sector. Experts in the nuclear industry could do with 
developing guidelines to measure cyber security risks by 
considering security and safety measures. This approach will in 
general prove effective against untargeted cyber-attacks.  
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